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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RAY PLEDGER, ) 
) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
) ON APPEAL 
vs ) 
) 
s. TONY cox, ) Case ~o. 16987 
) 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This proceeding involves a claim by appellant that 
the trial court, in a de novo hearing on a driver's license 
revocation under the implied consent law, erred in a ruling 
against appellant based on appellant's failure to support its 
position by evidence. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Maurice D. Jones found that appellant 
had refused to submit to a breathalyzer test as required by law 
and that appellant-plainitiff had not met its burden of proof as 
party seeking relief in a civil action. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks remand and a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was arrested for driving under the influence 
of alcohol on September 2, 1979. When requested to take the 
breathalyzer test by the arresting officer, appellant refused. 
Pursuant to statutory law requiring the revocation of the license 
of a driver who refuses to submit to a chemical test, appellant's 
driver's license was revoked after a hearing on the matter on 
the 31st day of October, 1979. 
Appellant filed a petition for a de novo review of the 
matter in District Court for the Third Judicial District- for 
Salt Lake County. Hearing was held on February 26, 1980. 
After hearing testimony and evidence presented, the trial court 
judge determined that appellant's burden of proof as plaintiff 
and moving party in the civil action was not met and that 
appellant-plaintiff had not sustained its position. (T. at 15, 16.) 
The trial judge then ruled that, as determined in the departmental 
hearing, appellant's driver's license should be revoked for one 
year. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT PRODUCED NO EVIDENCE AT 
THE TRIAL DE NOVO TO SHOW A LACK 
OF ANY OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS 
FOR A REVOCATION UNDER SECTION 41-
6-44JO, U.C.A. 1953, AS AMENDED 
-2-
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A cursory reading of the transcript of the trial below 
will show obviously and clearly that the appellant had an 
opportunity to present his case and evidence of the merits and 
simply failed to prove his allegations. 
A. BOTH IN THE DEPARTMENTAL HEARING AND DE 
NOVO REVIEW A PRIMA FACIE CASE WAS 
ESTABLISHED BY THE DEFENDANT DEPARTMENT 
OF PUBLIC SAFETY. 
Under authority of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10, 1953, 
as amended, the Department of Public Safety, Drivers' License 
Division is obligated to revoke the license of any person who: 
1) "has been placed under arrest" where the arresting officer 
"had grounds to believe the arrested person had been driving or 
was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol," and 2) "has thereafter been requested by 
a police officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests 
provided for," 3) has "refused to submit to such test or tests," 
4) "was warned by a police officer .•. that a refusal to submit 
to the test or tests can result in revocation of his license," 
and who 5) did not "immediately request the chemical test." 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.lO(b), 1953, as amended. 
The transcript of the trial evidence shows: 1) That 
appellant was placed under arrest (T. at 30) and that the arresting 
officer, on the basis of appellant's statement that he had "hit" 
a car (T. at 31), and on the basis of appellant's unsteadiness 
(T. at 33), odor of alcohol (T. at 33), and performance on the 
field sobriety tests (T. at 33), had grounds to believe appellant 
-3-
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had been driving while under the influence of alcohol; 2) that 
appellant was requested to take a breathalyzer test (T. at 30); 
3) that he refused (T. at 30, 33); 4) that he was warned of the 
consequences of his refusal (T. at 34); and 5) that appellant 
failed to request the test after this warning (T. at 34). 
B. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PRODUCED BY PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT WHICH SHOWED OR TENDED TO SHOW A 
LACK OF ANY OF THE FOREGOING ELEMENTS. 
The function of the trial judge is to weigh evidence. 
His determination should not be overturned unless it does violence 
to the facts. In the present case, in light of the lack of evidence 
to controvert the appellee-defendant' s prima facie case, the judge 
could not have ruled other than. he did, and therefore should not 
be overturned. 
While the plaintiff in a de novo refusal hearing is not 
required to overcome the entire weight of the original administra-
tive decision, it still must produce evidence which conflicts with 
any prima facie evidence of the essential elements. 
POINT II 
IN A CIVIL ACTION THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
IS ON THE PETITIONER TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE 
AND PERSUADE THE TRIER OF FACT OF THE 
ALLEGATIONS THE PETITIONER MAKES. 
Appellant set out in its complaint and petition to the 
district court an allegation challenging the arresting officer's 
"probable cause" to make the arrest for driving under the influence 
of alcohol. 
It is clearly Utah law that implied consent trial~ n~ 
-4-
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novo are civil proceedings. See the case of Ballard v. State 
Motor Vehicle Division, 595 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1974) and all of the 
subsequent cases on point. Therefore, the basic civil rules of 
procedure and evidence were probably used by the trial court. 
The trial court was fully aware of the court's opinions and 
decisions in these obvious kinds of cases and therefore did not 
apply the more rigorous requirements of a criminal case as was 
urged by the petitioner, yet he gave the petitioner a full 
opportunity to present evidence. 
Under elementary Utah law, Koesling v. Basamakis, 
539 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975), the proponent of a proposition must 
bear both the burden of producing evidence in support of that 
proposition, and the burden of persuading the trier of fact by 
a preponderance of the evidence as to that proposition. The 
appellant in this case cannot expect to make a general allegation 
and provide no support in evidence especially when his own 
evidence establishes the opposite claim of the defendant. 
In a de novo hearing subsequent to an administrative 
"Implied Consent" Revocation Hearing, the burden of proceeding 
with the evidence and persuading by a preponderance of the 
evidence should be on the motorist-licensee. In Heer v. Department 
of Motor Vehicles, 450 P.2d 533 (Oregon 1969), the Oregon Supreme 
Court ruled on the issue of burden of proof in a de novo hearing. 
The case involved an appeal from a de novo proceeding on the 
-.s-
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Motor Vehicle Department's suspension of the petitioner's license 
for refusing to submit to a chemical test under the implied consent 
laws. The petitioner alleged that it was a gross abuse of 
discretion "to require the petitioner to proceed first in the trial 
de novo when the reverse was their position in the administrative 
hearing." The court noted: 
The same complaint was made by the 
petitioner in Lira v. Billings and 
the Kansas Supreme Court held the 
statute there, procedurally identical 
with the Oregon statute, requires the 
petitioner, as the one seeking affirma-
tive relief, to carry the burden of 
proof. We agree with this analysis, 
and it follows that if petitioner has 
the burden he must initiate the 
evidence. Buda v. Fulton, 157 N.W.2d 
336 (Iowa 1968): 
The questions which have been raised 
by_ the petitioners, as shown by the 
foregoing discussion, all have been 
raised and disposed of in uniform holdings 
of the supreme courts of other states 
having statutes almost identical with the 
Implied Consent Law in Oregon. We agree 
with the results in those cases. 
Id at 537. This same issue was again before the Oregon Supreme 
Court in Burbage v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 450 P.2d 775 
(Oregon 1969) and the court referred to its earlier discussion 
in Heer v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, supra, and then went on to 
discuss the issue at more length: 
The trial court instructed the jury that 
the Department of Motor Vehicles had the 
burden of proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence and that the verdict must be by 
at least 10 to 2 majority. Petitioner 
claims that he was entitled to an instruc-
tion that the burden of the Department 
was to prove its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt and that the verdi ~ · Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Id at 777-778. 
The Department claims that the court erred 
in putting any burden of proof upon the 
Department because the burden was upon the 
petitioner; that the quantum of proof was 
by a preponderance of the evidence; and 
that the verdict should be the same as in 
civil cases--that is, not less than a 9 to 
3 majority. 
[3] In Heer; Grayson, supra, the first 
case to come before this court involving 
the Oregon Implied Consent Law, the cir-
c~it judge required the petitioners to go 
forward with the evidence. We affirmed 
that as the correct procedure and held 
that the burden of proof is upon the 
petitioner, citing Lira v. Billings, 196 
Kan. 726, 414 P.2d 13 (1966), and Buda 
v. Fulton, 157 N.W.2d 336 (Iowa 1968). 
The latter case held that the trial judge 
in an implied consent law appeal de novo 
to the court was in error in holding that 
the burden of proof was upon the department. 
The Iowa court discussed the meaning of "de 
novo" in this context, said that the 
petitioner was the one taking the aj?peal, 
that as· the appellant he necessarily made 
the affirmative allegations, and that the 
burden of oroof follows the Pleading. In 
this connection the Iowa Supreme Court cited 
our opinions in Burkholder v. S.I.A.C., 242 
Or. 276, 281, 282, 409 P.2d 342 (1965), and 
Dimitroff v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 209 Or. 
316, 321, 322, 306 P.2d 398 (1957). A 
review of these Oregon cases indicates that 
the compensation act governing the procedure 
there specifically placed the burden of proof 
on the party appealing from the administrative 
ruling. Unfortunately, the statute does not 
explicitly allocate the burden in this case. 
Nevertheless, the more logical and workable 
rule, as we held in Heer; Grayson, supra, is 
that the petitioner who makes the affirmative 
allegations has the burden of proving them and 
must initiate the evidence. ORS 172.250(5). 
[4] Buda v. Fulton, supra, as already noted, 
holds that the quantum of evidence necessary to 
carry the burden of proof in a case of this 
nature is a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis 
added.) 
-7-
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It should be noted that the Oregon Supreme Court has 
construed its provision for review of implied consent refusal 
hearings in the same manner as Utah has construed its provision. 
In fact, the Oregon court notes this, citing McAnerney v. State 
Dept. of Public Safety, 9 Utah 2d 191, 194, 341 P.2d 212, 214 
(1959) in its opinion in Stehle v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 
368 P.2d 386, 390 (Oregon 1962). It construes its statute as 
requiring an independent determination, in a trial de novo, in 
the same sense as the Utah Supreme Court has in McAnerney. This 
adds a great deal of persuasiveness to the argument that Utah 
should resolve the burden of proof question along the lines of 
the Oregon rationale in Heer and Burbage. 
The two cases cited by the Oregon court, Lira v. Billings, 
196 Kan. 726, 414 P.2d 13 (1966) and Buda v. Fulton, 157 N.W. 
2d 336 (Iowa 1968), directly addressed the burden of proof issue. 
The Kansas Supreme Court in Lira stated: 
We further hold that K.S.A. 8-259(a) requires 
a trial de novo of the particular question at 
issue, governed by the rules applicable to 
civil proceedings in the district court, with 
the burden of proof on petitioner as the one 
seeking affirmative relief. (Emphasis added.) 
Id at 18. The Iowa Supreme Court held that since a licensee's 
statutory appeal from ad administrative hearing is heard de novo, 
with the right to present evidence as in an ordinary action 
commenced originally in the district court, the burden of proof is 
on the plaintiff licensee. Buda v. Fulton, supra, at 338-339. 
Faced with this same issue, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
cited rulings of several different juris-~= -~~co-~----~ -~-- c:.hat: 
-8-
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The rationale of the Iowa court set forth 
in Buda v. Fulton, supra, is persuasive and 
we refer the reader to that opinion. We 
hold that en appeal to the District Court .•. 
from an order of the Director of the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles ..• revoking a motor 
vehicle operator's license, the burden of 
proof is on the licensee to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence the ground 
for reversal. 
MacKey v. Director of Dept. ·of Motor Vehicles, 194 Neb. 707, 
235 N.W. 2d 394, at 397 (1975). 
A later Oregon case applied the law cited above in a 
fact situation similar to the present case in that appellant 
alleged a lack of. reasonable grounds for his arrest. The court 
held that "on appeal to the circuit court, petitioner had the 
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his 
license was wrongfully suspended, i.e., that one of the elements 
..• was not present. 11 Nordquist v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 
552 P.2d 873, 874 (Oregon App. 1976). (Emphasis added.) 
Other courts have ruled that the burden of proof on 
appeal or in a de novo hearing from a drivers license revocation 
is on the licensee. Lutjemeyer v. Dennis, 186 Neb. 46, 180 N.W. 
2d 679 {1970); Hoban v. Rice, 22 Ohio App. 2d 130, 259 N.E.2d 
136 {1970). In addition, courts in several states have addressed 
the burden of proof issue making it depend on the specific 
allegations made by licensees: no refusal because of confusion 
over Miranda warning; State v. Severino, 537 P.2d 1187 (Hawaii 1975); 
Strand v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 8 Wash. App. 877, 509 
P.2d 999 (1973); Barton v. Director of Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 
l~ --- -- -- ..... 863 (1975); authorization of particular 
-9-
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test by implied consent laws; Meyer v. Dept. of Public Safety 
License Control, Etc., 312 So. 2d 289 (La. 1975). All of these 
courts have held the burden of proof as to these allegations to 
be on the petitioner. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY 
ANY OF THE PROCEDURES IN THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the district court committed 
error of some type, appellant must show that such error was 
prejudicial and not harmless. 
Appellant has asked for remand and a new de novo refusal 
hearing. Having failed to move for a new trial under Rule 59, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the appellant should not be 
rewarded for such failure by being allowed a new trial under 
requirements not set out in Rules 59(a) and 61, and by this Court's 
decisions applying those rules. 
CONCLUSION 
According to Utah law, the burden of proof is on the 
party pleading or alleging a proposition. The Utah Supreme Court 
may not have directly ruled on the specific procedure and rule 
of evidence in a de novo review of a driver's license refusal 
hearing under implied consent law, as provided for by statute, 
however, courts of several other states have ruled on this issue 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and as a whole found the burden of proof consistently on the 
petitioner, as is the usual rule in all civil proceedings. Courts 
in these states, many of which have implied consent statutes very 
similar to Utah's (e.g. Oregon and Kansas), apply the basic rule 
that the moving party has the burden of production and persuasion, 
Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975), to de novo 
proceedings. 
The discretion of the trial court should not be 
overturned unless it is prejudicial. Appellant supplied no 
evidence to upset the prima facie evidence of the appellee nor 
has it alleged any prejudice on appeal. Appellee urges this 
court to affirm the judgment of the district court and deny the 
appeal as being spurious. 
DATED this 21st day of July, 1980. 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
~ .. ,~~ 
BRUCE M. HALE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
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